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Over the last few decades, consumers have become accustom to the 
convenience of Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) to transfer funds between accounts, 
provide account balance information and to withdraw cash from savings, checking, and 
other account types. Along with the convenience and ease of locating an ATM through 
mobile bank apps, there has been a significant increase in ATM fraud across the globe. 
Consumer confidence in the ATM, bank and credit card issuer is greatly impacted by 
the perceived level of security in ATM transactions and the technology behind them. 
Confronting the risk associated with ATM fraud and limiting its impact is an important 
issue that face financial institutions as the sophistication of fraud techniques have 
advanced. Largely the process behind the verification of these transactions has moved 
from Plain Old Telephone System (POTS) to Ethernet connections to the processors, 
banks and card issuers. The attack surface has grown, both in size and complexity. 
These security risks should be prompting the industry to research all attack surfaces, 
and this research looks specifically the Ethernet packets that make up these types of 
transactions. In this research, I investigate the packet structure and predictability within 
ATM Ethernet traffic.  Even with the proliferation of retail ATMs in the most common of 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Introduction 
 As with many conveniences of the modern age, the ATM has brought with its 
popularity the chance of compromised personal data. “Fraud perpetrated at the 
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) has suddenly and somewhat unexpectedly exploded 
to the highest rate in two decades” (Sidel, 2015). The uptick in fraud cases is largely 
due to the new more secure credit and debit cards that banks and credit card 
companies are rushing to replace the 30-year-old magnetic strip technology. “Criminals 
‘know there is still vulnerability [at the ATM] and they are trying to capitalize on it,’ said 
Owen Wild, director of security marketing at NCR Corp., on the of the largest ATM 
manufactures” (Sidel, 2015). While the majority of these cases involve capturing the 
information at the point of reading the card, this research is looking at the possible 
vulnerability from and on the network that the ATM is connected, the construction of the 
packets, and the security protocols used in the TCP portion of the packets..  
ATMs (or Automated Teller Machines) are what are known as Alternative 
Delivery Channels.  
• Alternative, because they are alternative to the human teller. 
• Delivery because they are programmed to deliver a specific set of services.  
• Channel because in the banking world, all delivery mechanisms need a 
channel via which the delivery would be made (Khan, 2015). 
The security of ATM transactions requires a continuous and proactive review of 




in the protocols used, and operating system security. The challenges of the market 
include : 
• Constant evolution of threats 
• 30-year-old technology still in use in the form of magnetic stripe cards  
• Transition to new embedded chip cards 
• Prevalent use of legacy operating systems 
Analyzing ATM originated Ethernet traffic to create a template for forensics 
analysis of packets in order to provide a signature for firewalls, determine vulnerabilities 
based on the characteristics of the traffic, and what follow on work could be 
recommended, is the goal of this research.  This research will use a common off-the-
shelf protocol analyzer and determine if a forensics investigator could identify ATM 
traffic using a packet inspection profile without the knowledge of the sending or 
receiving IP information. Should a benchmark be possible from this work, there are 
many other avenues to explore in the retail ATM market. 
Problem Statement 
We want all of our ATM transactions to be safe and secure even while the 
transactional data is in transit from the ATM over the internet to the processing servers 
and back.  
Today, more and more ATMs are connecting to their processing servers via the 
Internet with Ethernet and, in some cases, Wi-Fi connections. There are significant 
vulnerabilities that need to be explored to create better-protected transactions for 




allow the capture and nefarious use of private information and harm consumers, 
retailers and the banking industry. We will use packet sniffing software to capture 
packets from different types of ATM transactions, evaluate them for predictability, and 
determine the level of ease in finding transactions in a congested production network. 
All ATMs connect to a server to process transactions. As seen in Figure 1, the 
ATM network connects to the cloud as do all of the entities involved in a transaction. 
The internal bank network is connected to the cloud and pushes account information 
updates to an ATM Outsource Network Provider. When an ATM or Point of Sale (POS) 
machine initiates a transaction, the ATM Outsource Network Provider handles the 
verification of the card and PIN if used, that sufficient funds are available for the 
requested transaction, among other details. In the past, all ATMs completed 
transactions via POTS. Today, there are a number of communication technologies 
being employed including cabled Ethernet, Wireless Ethernet, cellular data, and satellite 
internet connections. Each of these presents a unique attack surface, but all depend on 
an Ethernet connection at some point between the ATM and processing server.  
 




 When a transaction is initiated, it follows a flow chart approximated in Figure 2. 
One of the parts of this study is to determine if it is possible, as the customer works 
through the decision tree, to see when data is transmitted. In the previous work, data 
was only transmitted once all the prompts had been satisfied and the customer chose 
what amount of money was to be withdrawn and from which account. With the advent of 































































Nature and Significance of the Problem 
 The ATM industry has had several government and self-mandated software and 
equipment updates in a very short period of time. They include changes to the American 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) elements of an ATM; industry changes to the new and much 
more secure Euro pay, MasterCard, and Visa (EMV) card technology; and an industry 
change from dial-up modems to Ethernet and Internet Protocol (IP) based 
communications. The sheer volume of changes has created a confusing and 
challenging landscape of regulatory compliance, security gaps, and cost. Combined, 
this environment has attracted hackers and organized crime groups to pounce on the 
security gaps and is a world-wide issue. The adaption of current technologies has 
prompted a change from transmitting transaction data over phone lines to Ethernet 
connections to the cloud with an encrypted payload.  
Recently, due to heavier computing demands and the falling price of computer-
like architectures, ATMs have moved away from custom hardware architectures 
using microcontrollers and / or application-specific integrated circuits, most of 
which are based on Intel 8086 architecture, to adopting a hardware architecture 
that is very similar to a personal computer. Many ATMs are now able to use 
commercial operating systems such as Microsoft Windows and Linux. Although 
it is undoubtedly cheaper to use commercial off–the–shelf hardware, it does 
make ATMs vulnerable to the same sort of problems exhibited by conventional 




Logical attacks on ATMs are on the rise. ATM fraud has increased in 
sophistication and organization. These organizations have become adept in developing 
methods and hardware to take advantage of new technologies such as miniaturization, 
battery life and communications methods like WiFi, Bluetooth, and Near Field 
Communication (NFC). 
Remote attacks target the ATM networks and attempt to compromise the 
communication with the host. These attacks are more critical because a hacker 
does not need to open up the ATMs. As ATM technology knowledge becomes 
widespread, monitoring systems access through web browsers or TELNET 
enables an easy access to attackers who can hijack ATM management systems 
and perform management functions. ATM networks are still vulnerable to similar 
IP based network attacks. Remote attacks such as Eavesdropping, Spoofing, 
Denial of Service, Sniffing and Virtual Channel Theft are almost always carried 
out by criminal organizations. (Chafalon 2012, ¶11-13) 
Souvignet, Hatin, Maqua, Tesniere, Léger, and Hormière (2014)  reported that 
there are two main classifications of payment card fraud, card not present and physical 
fraud. The one we are concerned with here is “physical fraud, where data originates 
from lost and stolen cards, skimming, shimming, man in the middle attacks, Automated 
Teller Machine (ATM) reverse engineering, etc.” (p. 143). 
Along with the hardware and software changes, there has been a significant shift 
from dial-up to Ethernet and wireless communication via the internet. This is the focus of 




based on a multi-point inspection method. It is the norm when doing network forensics or 
traffic analysis to look at port numbers. In this case the port number is standard, 443, 
and will aid identification of the target traffic but it will not be the sole metric used. It 
should be noted that “the traditional approach that relies on transport layer port numbers 
is largely limited with less than 70% accuracy for application identification” (Alblawi & 
Jinoh, 2014, p. 4). With that in mind, the decision was made to include a study of the 
encrypted payload and header information with the exclusion of the destination IP 
address. To deal with the limitations of port-based inspection, payload information or 
statistical flow features were used. The payload-based identification inspects application 
data for traffic classification such as search application-specific signatures. Some 
interesting work has been done in this area with very good results.  
A machine learning based approach employing simple packet header feature 
sets and statistical flow feature sets without using the IP addresses, 
source/destination ports and payload information to unveil encrypted application 
tunnels in network traffic. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach as a 
forensic analysis tool on two encrypted applications Secure Shell (SSH) and 
Skype, using traces captured from entirely different networks. (Alshammari & 
Zincir-Heywood, 2010, p. 1326) 
Objective of the Study 
 The objective of this study is to formulate an initial set of network forensics 
metrics that determine the predictability of current Automated Teller Machine Ethernet 




study should determine the number of packets generated during different types of 
transactions, packet size, packet order and determine what human readable and 
encrypted components exist in each packet type.  
Study Questions/Hypotheses 
1. How many packets make up each of the six transactions types? 
a. ATM Startup 
b. Insufficient Funds 
c. Balance Check Incorrect PIN 
d. Balance Check Successful 
e. $20 Withdrawn 
f. $60 Withdrawn  
2. Is each packet of predictable length? 
3. Is packet length influenced by transaction type? 
4. What protocols are used throughout each transaction? 
5. What known vulnerabilities exist regarding the packet construction and 
protocols used in ATM transaction packets? 
Limitations of the Study 
 This study is limited to the developing an understanding of the number, size and 
repeatable patterns that may occur within several different ATM transaction types. Due 
to legal limitations, we are unable to do any analysis of the packet payloads and the 





Definition of Terms 
 3DES(“triple DES”). Triple DES applies the Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
cipher algorithm three times to each data block. In general, TDES was introduced to 
have three keys. Having a key length of 168 bits: three 56-bit DES keys. When it was 
discovered that a 56-bit key of DES is not enough to protect from attacks, TDES was 
chosen as a simple way to enlarge the keyspace without a need to switch to a new 
algorithm. Triple DES simply extends the key size of DES by applying the algorithm 
three times in succession with three different keys (Debnath, Agrawal, & Vaishnav 
2014). 
ATM Vault.  The ATM Vault is a secure section of an ATM, separate from the 
bezel containing the card reader, screen, EPP Pin Pad and receipt printer. It contains 
the Cash dispensing unit and is secured by either an electronic or dial combination lock. 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).  ADA is a civil rights law that 
prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas of public life, 
including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and private places that are open to 
the general public. The purpose of the law is to make sure that people with disabilities 
have the same rights and opportunities as everyone else (ADA National Network). 
Automated Teller Machine (ATM).  An ATM is a computerized electronic 
machine that performs basic banking functions (such as handling check deposits or 
issuing cash withdrawals) (Merriam-Webster's collegiate dictionary 2018). 
Bluetooth.  A standard for the short-range wireless interconnection of mobile 




Card Holder. A person who has a credit or debit card. 
Card Issuer. A bank or credit union who offers credit cards. When consumers 
make credit card purchases, the credit card issuer is responsible for sending payments 
to merchants for purchases made with credit cards from that bank.  
Cash Dispensing Unit (CDU).  Within the vault of an ATM is the cash 
dispensing unit. The CDU has electronic sensors that count each bill as it exits the 
dispenser. It also has sensors that detect damaged bills, doubles or bills stuck together 
and that detect jammed bills.  
Comma Separated Value (CSV).  A simple file format used to store tabular data, 
such as a spreadsheet or database. Files in the CSV file format can be imported to and 
exported from programs that store data in tables such as Microsoft Excel or OpenOffice 
Calc. 
EMV Card Reader. An electronic sensor that reads an EMV chip, magnetic strip, 
bar code on a credit card, membership card, etc. (ATM of America, n.d.). 
EMV Chip (Euro pay, MasterCard, and Visa).  A payment instrument technology 
with an embedded microprocessor chip that store and protect cardholder data (ATM of 
America, n.d.). 
Encrypting PIN Pad (EPPs). A form a component of unattended PIN Entry 
Devices. Typically, EPPs are used to enter a cardholder’s PIN in a secure manner. 
EPPs are used in conjunction with ATMs, automated fuel dispensers, kiosks, and 
vending machines. Requirements for these devices are found in security documents 




Ethernet.  The traditional technology for connecting wired local area networks 
(LANs), enabling devices to communicate with each other via a protocol -- a set of rules 
or common network language. As a data-link layer protocol in the TCP/IP stack, 
Ethernet describes how network devices can format and transmit data packets so other 
devices on the same local or campus area network segment can recognize, receive and 
process them. An Ethernet cable is the physical, encased wiring over which the data 
travels (TechTarget Network, n.d.a). 
Ethernet Hub.  A basic type of wired network device that allows multiple 
connected computers to communicate via broadcast communication. 
Firewall. Part of a computer system or network that is designed to block 
unauthorized access while permitting outward-bound communication (Firewall, n.d.). 
 Frame. A digital data transmission unit in computer networking and 
telecommunication. A frame typically includes synchronization features consisting of a 
sequence of bits or symbols that indicate to the receiver, the beginning, and end of the 
payload data within the stream of symbols or bits it receives (Cisco Networking 
Academy, 2017). 
Input/output Board (I/O Board). A circuit board that contains physical 
connections to peripheral devices. In an ATM these include the receipt printer, card 
reader, and cash dispensing unit, LCD screen, and EPP Pin Pad (ATM of America, 
n.d.). 
Internet Protocol (IP). The principal communications protocol in the internet 




enables internetworking and essentially establishes the internet (Cisco Networking 
Academy, 2017). 
IP Packet. In computer networks, a pack is a container or box that carries data 
over a TCP/IP network and internetworks. A packet contains several pieces of 
information, including the data it is carrying, source and destination IP addresses and 
other constraints required for quality of service and packet handling (Cisco Networking 
Academy, 2017). 
Local Area Network (LAN). A local area network (LAN) is a group of computers 
and associated devices that share a common communications line or wireless link to a 
server. Typically, a LAN encompasses computers and peripherals connected to a 
server within a distinct geographic area such as an office or a commercial 
establishment. Computers and other mobile devices use a LAN connection to share 
resources such as a printer or network storage (TechTarget Network, n.d.b). 
 Logical Port. In programming, a port is a “logical connection place” and 
specifically, using the Internet’s protocol, TCP/IP, the way a client program specifies a 
particular server program on a computer in a network. Higher-level applications that use 
TCP/IP such as the Web protocol, Hypertext Transfer Protocol, have ports with pre-
assigned numbers (Cisco Networking Academy, 2017). 
Main Board. Sometimes knows as the motherboard, this is the main printed 
circuit board found in general purpose microcomputers such as in an ATM and other 




electronic components of a system. Such as the central processing unit (CPU) and 
memory and provides connectors for other peripherals (ATM of America, n.d.). 
Near Field Communication (NFC). A technology allowing the short-range 
wireless intercommunication of mobile phones and other electronic devices for 
purposes such as making payments. 
Network Switch.  A computer networking device that connects devices together 
on a computer network by using packet switching to receive, process, and forward data 
to the destination device. A network switch is a multi-port network bridge that uses 
hardware addresses to process and forward data at the data link layer (layer 2) of the 
OSI model. Some switches can also process data at the network layer (layer 3) by 
additionally incorporating routing functionality. Such switches are commonly known as 
layer-3 switches or multilayer switches (Cisco Networking Academy, 2017). 
Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) Model. A conceptual model that 
characterizes and standardized the communication functions of a telecommunication or 
computing system without regard to its underlying internal structure and technology. 
• Layer 1: Physical Layer. Defines electrical and physical specifications for 
devices. The physical layer defines the relationship between a device and a 
transmission medium, such as a copper or optical cable. 
• Layer 2: Data Link Layer. Provides the functional and procedural means to 
transfer data between network entities and to detect and possibly correct 




• Layer 3: Network Layer. Provides the functional and procedural means of 
transferring variable length data sequences from a source host on one 
network to a destination host on a different network, while maintaining the 
quality of service requested by the transport layer (in contrast to the data link 
layer which connects hosts within the same network). 
• Layer 4: Transport Layer. Provides transparent transfer of data between 
end users, providing reliable data transfer services to the upper layers of the 
OSI model. The transport layer controls the reliability of a given link through 
flow control, segmentation and desegmentation, and error control (Cisco 
2017) 
Packet Sniffer. A program that can record all network packets that travel past a 
given network interface, on a given computer, on a network. It can be used to 
troubleshoot network problems, as well as to extract sensitive information such as 
credentials from unencrypted login sessions. 
Payment Card Industry (PCI). The segment of the financial industry that 
governs the use of all electronic forms of payment. 
Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC). This 
oversees policies and technologies behind non-cash payments including transactions 
involving credit cards, prepaid cards, point-of-sale cards, e-purse, bank debit, and ATM 
cards. 
Payment Processor. A company (often a third party) appointed by a merchant 




merchant acquiring banks. They are usually broken down into two types: front-end and 
back-end. 
Personal Identification Number (PIN).  An identifying number allocated to an 
individual by a bank or other organization and used for validating electronic 
transactions. 
Physical Port. On computer and telecommunication devices, a port is generally 
a specific place for being physically connected to some other device, usually with a 
socket and plug (Cisco Networking Academy, 2017). 
Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS). A retronym for voice-grade telephone 
service employing analog signal transmission over copper loops. POTS was the 
standard service offering from telephone companies from 1876 until 1988.  POTS 
remains the basic form of residential and small business service connection to the 
telephone network in many parts of the world. The term reflects the technology that has 
been available since the introduction of the public telephone system in the late 19th 
century, in a form mostly unchanged despite the introduction of Touch-Tone dialing, 
electronic telephone exchanges and fiber-optic communication into the public switched 
telephone network (Plain old telephone service, n.d.). 
Router. A networking device that forwards data packets between computer 
networks. Routers perform the traffic directing functions on the Internet. Data sent 
through the internet, such as a web page or email, is in the form of data packets. A 
packet is typically forwarded from one router to another router through the networks that 




two or more data lines from different networks. When a data packet comes in on one of 
the lines, the router reads the network address information in the packet to determine 
the ultimate destination. Then, using information in its routing table or routing policy, it 
directs the packet to the next network on its journey (Cisco Networking Academy, 
2017). 
Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1). A cryptographic hash function which takes 
an input and produces a 160-bit (20-byte) hash value known as a message digest, 
typically rendered as a hexadecimal number, 40 digits long. 
Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-256. One of a number of cryptographic hash 
functions. SHA-256 algorithm generates an almost unique, fixed size 256-bit (32-byte) 
has. 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL). A standard security technology for establishing an 
encrypted link between a web server and a browser. This link ensures that all data 
passed between the web server and browsers remain private and integral. This protocol 
has now been depreciated by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and has 
largely been replaced by Transport Layer Security (Cisco Networking Academy, 2017). 
TLSv1.2. The newest SSL protocol version. It introduces new SSL/TLS cipher 
suites that use the SHA-256 hash algorithm instead of the SHA-1 function, which adds 
significant strength to the data integrity. 
 Telnet.  A network protocol that allows a user on one computer to log onto 





Terminal Number. A unique alpha-numeric identifier for each ATM terminal that 
identifies it to the processing system and is used in combination with the 3DES 
validation process to make the initial authentication of the terminal to the processing 
system. It is also used to identify the specific machine during each transaction 
processed by that terminal (ATM of America, n.d.). 
Transport Layer Security (TLS). A protocol that provides privacy and data 
integrity between two communicating applications (Cisco Networking Academy, 2017). 
 Uniform Resource Locator (URL). The address of a resource on the Internet. A 
URL indicates the location of a resource as well as the protocol used to access the 
resource (Cisco Networking Academy, 2017). 
Wi-Fi. The technology for radio wireless local area networking of devices based 
on the International Electronic and Electrical Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standards (Cisco 





Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction 
 There are two areas of importance to this proposal. First, successfully capturing 
packet data from a variety of ATM transaction types. And second, the determination 
packet data predictability. In previous work, both aspects were proven to be correct and 
repeatable. However, this may not be the case with the large number of security and 
technology changes made in the intervening four years. The specific changes are: 
• Updated and patched Windows CE 6.0 
• Updated firmware for: 
o EMV Card Reader 
o Cash Dispensing Unit 
o PCI Compliant Key Pad 
o Receipt Printer 
• Hardware and software upgrade from a magnetic stripe card reader to EMV 
chip reader. 
o New card reader 
o New software 
o New internal cables and grounding connections 
• Card being swiped to card being dipped and held during the transaction. 
• Network settings for FIS changed from a public IP address to a URL.   




• FIS server settings changed to reject connection attempts that do not meet 
the new minimum settings for EMV upgrades. 
o Must use URL 
o TLSv1.2 or higher 
o EMV must be configured on the terminal with appropriate PIDs 
activated 
o Software version 6.1.19 or higher must be installed. 
In the course of this literature review, known ATM attacks and vulnerabilities, as 
well as the packet sniffing process using common Windows-based open source tools 
will be explored.  
Background Related to the Problem 
 There has been a significant shift from POTS to Ethernet for secure connections 
between ATMs and their processing servers. Along with this shift, ATMs have become 
almost ubiquitous in all retail settings. The manufacturer of the ATM used in this study 
reports sales in excess of 100,000 units in the United States alone. According to 
Pymnts.com (2017), the “number of ATMs in the U.S. now stands between 475,000 and 
500,000 in 2017” ( ¶ 1). They are found in convenience stores, bars, restaurants, 
hotels/motels, and even at short-lived events such as outdoor music festivals and fairs. 
In some cases, the businesses involved do not own the ATM but do provide the 
communication infrastructure and in the case of Ethernet, lack the expertise to secure 
their networks, nor understand what a compromised network looks like. In many 




Packet Sniffer, a compact host device and basic knowledge, the transactions that make 
up the startup communication between the ATM and processing server and transactions 
themselves. 
Literature Related to the Problem 
There is very little to be found in literature related specifically to packet capture of 
ATM traffic. The vast majority discuss security as it relates to customer satisfaction, 
physical security, skimmers, malware, and other much more common threats. 
Therefore, literature has been included literature where security threats from the 
network are mentioned but rarely described beyond that they are threats found on a 
network. 
The ATM has become as, if not more, ubiquitous than pay telephones were in 
the past. They can be found in nearly every local eating establishment, convenience 
store, airport, college, and even hospitals. There are a variety of methods for the ATM 
to connect to its processing and validating server which include POTS, Ethernet, WiFi, 
and direct connection to a computer host as a peripheral device. 
The benefits of ATM that can be derived from ATM usage are so numerous, 
some are outlined below: 
• Flexible account access allows clients to access their accounts at their 
convenience. 
• MFI (bank) personnel are not required to be present for transactions and have 
more time to serve clients. 




• More clients can be reached beyond the branch network, such as in smaller 
population centers. 
• More low-cost funds are available because ATMs make it easier for clients to 
deposit savings. (Adepju & Alhassan, 2010, p. 4-5) 
The security threats are described in how they affect the convenience of ATMs 
as a service but often not in terms of threats to the user’s private data. The convenience 
that ATMs provide comes with inherent risks both to the consumer as well as the ATM 
owner.  
ATM fraud is not the sole problem of banks alone; it is a big threat, and it 
requires coordinated and cooperative action on the part of the bank, customers, 
and the law enforcement machinery. The ATM frauds not only cause financial 
loss to banks, but they also undermine customers’ confidence in the use of 
ATMs. (Brunner, Decressin, Hardy, & Kudela, 2004) 
The threats to ATMs are both local to the individual machine and can be found in 
the cloud services that provide authentication and transactional information between the 
ATM, cardholder and processing agent’s infrastructure. “With the introduction of internet 
technology in recent years, the Internet communication is exposed to unwanted people 
giving them access to pose different kinds of attacks on ATM Systems” (Twum, Nti, & 
Assante, 2016, p. 126). Within this statement, the importance of this study can be found 
and supported. With the significant shift from POTS as the primary means of 
communication to Ethernet-based technologies, opens up the means to capture 




consumers’ confidence in bank and credit card companies.  The gains by criminals have 
been massive in scope and lighting quick in implementation.  
In 2013, Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) confirms money theft from an ATM of 
about GH¢3 million (Obour 2013) and a worldwide gang of criminals stole $45 
million in a matter of hours by hacking their way into a database of prepaid debit 
cards and then draining cash machines around the globe. (Modern Ghana, 2013, 
p. 127) 
The scope of an effect on consumer confidence is an often-studied phenomenon 
in many countries throughout the world. This provides the motivation to assess the 
security risks, develop standards and create benchmarks to more efficiently and 
definitively discover and evaluate compromised aspects of an ATM transaction. “Since it 
is a day of technology, innovation, and cyber-hacking, so security and privacy of 
customer’s information (Pin code, password, etc.) is a burning issue that has an impact 
on customer’s satisfaction and dissatisfaction” (Hossain, Russel, & Robidas, 2015, p. 
68). Customer satisfaction impacts due to security concerns directly relate to this study. 
While the vast infrastructure comprising the ATM and mobile banking system is largely 
out of sight to the majority of consumers, the attack surface, even if only looking at the 
network related portion is large, has many intrusion points and each is likely controlled 
by an entity with little or no relationship to another nor have the expertise to adequately 
physically or logically secure their network infrastructure. For many businesses, with 




required very little in the way of physical or logical security. Ethernet security is well 
beyond what they have experienced and often is not a priority. 
Literature Related to the Methodology 
Capturing and determining packet type, length, protocols used, encryption found 
if any, and addressing information are the significant data types being sought with this 
work. To that end, a packet sniffer configured in promiscuous mode will be used.  
IP based sniffing is the most commonly used method of packet sniffing. In this 
method, a requirement of setting network card into promiscuous mode exist. 
When network card is set into promiscuous mode, then the host will be able to 
sniff all packets. (Rupam, Verma, & Singh, 2013, p. 23) 
The software Wireshark is a powerful network or protocol analyzer, otherwise 
known as a packet sniffer. It can be used to look in detail at the structure and content of 
packets captured from the network interface on the host computer. The features of 
Wireshark include: 
• Data is analyzed either from the wire over the network connection or from 
data files that have already captured data packets. 
• Supports live data reading and analysis for a wide range of networks 
(including Ethernet, IEEE 802.11, point-to-point Protocol (PPP) and 
loopback). 





• For programmatically editing and converting the captured files to the editcap 
application, users can use command line switches. 
• Display filters are used to filter and organize the data display. 
• New protocols can be scrutinized by creating plug-ins. (Wireshark, n.d.)   
The end goal of this work is to determine if a benchmark of predictable traffic can 
be found. In the end, this could be useful in further use of a packet sniffer to monitor 
network assets.  
The most common goal of packet sniffing is to monitor network assets to detect 
anomalous behavior and misuse. This concept has been around for nearly 
twenty years, but only recently has it seen a dramatic rise in popularity and 
incorporation into the overall information security infrastructure. (Banerjee, 
Vashishtha, & Saxena, 2010, p. 2) 
Due to the dearth of literature on the use of a packet sniffer to specifically capture 
ATM traffic, the methodology of packet capture is generic in nature at the proposed 





Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction 
This section outlines creating the test environment used for ATM transactions 
over Ethernet networks with the use of a packet analyzer. Owing to the limited 
availability of a real-world e-commerce Ethernet network to perform this experiment, the 
ATM will be connected to a network in an industrial setting to simulate a congested 
retail network for this study. We will discuss the setup and design of the network and the 
structured approaches that will assist in this study. 
Design of the Study 
 To answer the given research question, quantitative methods would be most 
appropriate to find an answer. For the data samples collected commonly found in the 
market place retail ATM, a debit card, and running six transaction types: 
• Successful Withdrawal $20 
• Successful Withdrawal $60 
• Successful Balance Check Zero Balance 
• Successful Balance Check $110 
• Insufficient Funds 
• Failed Transaction – Expired Card 
Data Collection 
 The initial set of data will be collected in small network will little overhead or other 
traffic to obtain an understanding of each of the transmissions more easily. As seen in 




router and out to the cloud. The packet sniffing host is connected to the hub to provide 







Figure 3. Common ATM Network Diagram 
After the first data set has been analyzed and any repeatable metrics have been 
determined, the second set of data will be collected in a much more congested 
production network. The ATM will be placed deep within a segmented network to create 
a condition in which a packet sniffer will have to contend with a much larger number of 
packets. This could create the possibility of packets with similar characteristics of those 




















Figure 4. Congested Production Network Packet Capture Topology 
Tools and Techniques 
 To analyze the packet data collected in WireShark, the following information was 
collected for each transaction and evaluated against each transaction for the following 
metrics: 
• The initial ATM machine start up and connect to the processing server 
• Number of packets per transaction 
• Size, in bytes, found in each packet 
Hardware and Software Environment 
 This study required the use of a Windows workstation, running Windows 10, 
Wireshark Network Analyzer v2.6.4, a hub, a border network segment, production 





Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
 The data collected in the research was collected as designed without 
complications. The process of mining the data for the elements related to this research 
was also completed without issue. The very capable filters available in WireShark made 
this process efficient and allowed the results to be saved as a Comma Separated Value 
(CSV) file, opened in Microsoft Excel and further sorted and analyzed. The results, 
however, show some expected and unexpected elements that require some 
manipulating of the data to get to the sought-after information. The process of culling 
the data is described for each of the research questions as needed. 
Data Presentation 
 Unlike the original research project, the data stream between the ATM and the 
processing server at startup was captured in order to determine if the new requirements 
relating to ENV chips, changing to TLSv1.2, and updated and patched OS and PAI 
software. At the time of the previous work, a more basic authentication process to the 
server that occurs each time the ATM is powered up, often used POTS versus Ethernet 
which has since become more prevalent. In addition to a large shift to using Ethernet 
instead of POTS, the authentication process has grown in complexity and duration. The 
addition of EMV card readers, TLSv1.2, and the latest PCI compliant keypads are the 
cause of the new complexity while the OS and PAI software and peripheral firmware 
versions remain a component of the startup authentication checks but did not add 




perspective of the number, size, and protocols found in the data packets, led to the first 
data capture. This data set was also used this to verify that the network segment used 
had a considerable amount of traffic. In Figure 5 below, a truncated display of the first 
WireShark capture of approximately 2 minutes and 36 seconds during which nearly 
73,000 packets were captured.  
 
 
Figure 5. ATM Start-up Authentication Packet Capture 
With this initial capture, the authentication to the server can be found, along with 
the resolved IP address of the server, TCP handshake, and TLSv1.2 Client Hello and 






Figure 6. Initial ATM Authentication Packet Capture 
This 22-packet data exchange includes updating the processor with the current 
terminal number, amount of cash in the vault and any other parameters that may have 
changed. These could include the terminal ID, software version, and firmware versions 
for any of the peripherals such as the printer, cash dispensing unit (CDU), card reader, 
or PCI keypad. In the case of the terminal ID or the PCI Keypad, if they had been 
changed and not re-authenticated by keying in 3DES keys and a secondary 
authorization to the server via a POTS connection, the machine would not be 
authenticated and would not enter a transaction ready state and would go out of order. 
This machine was properly programmed and updated and was allowed to enter a ready 
state for customers to initiate a transaction. 
 After the ATM had been verified to be authenticated to the processing server, the 
test transactions were run. From the initial capture showing the authentication to the 




192.168.0.7. These addresses were then used to filter the packets in each capture to an 
output that only included packets from each transaction and those addresses. Once the 
ATM had received DHCP services and dynamically obtained a private IP address, the 
start-up data was collected showing that IP address. Then the ATM was statically 
configured with that same private IP address to keep the data collected consistent and 
efficient. It should be noted that one of the changes from the captures done in 2012 is 
that the ATM is programmed to connect to a URL requiring a DNS resolution of that 
URL to an IP address. In the past, ATM’s were programmed with the public IP address 
of the FIS server which removed the step of the DNS resolution. This was one of 
several new security protocols implemented at the time that EMV cards were required in 
ATMs. One of those filtered data captures is shown in Figure 7. The filtered captures for 
each of the six different transactions can be found in the index. 
 




For comparison to the previous work which is the basis for the current research 
questions, Table 1 shows the packet numbers and size for each transaction in the 2012 
study. Every transaction type was completely predictable in the number of packets and 
only had two outliers in packet size out of 85 data points. This confirmed the possibility 
of creating a network forensics benchmark for ATM Ethernet traffic under the conditions 
tested and the authenticating server’s requirements at that time. 
Table 1 
Packets Captured for Five Test Transactions 
 
 However, Table 2 created from the current research shows a different result. The 
number of packets per transaction varies from 21 to 24, and the orderly size of packets 




Table 2  
 
Packets Captured for Five Test Transactions (2019) 
Packet # Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 
1 62 62 62 62 62 62 
2 60 60 60 60 60 60 
3 60 60 60 60 60 60 
4 361 361 361 361 361 361 
5 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 
6 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 
7 392 392 392 392 392 392 
8 60 396 60 60 60 60 
9 105 60 396 396 396 396 
10 396 180 60 60 60 60 
11 60 60 180 180 180 180 
12 187 105 60 60 60 60 
13 60 731 105 105 105 105 
14 180 60 731 60 60 731 
15 60 221 60 731 731 60 
16 105 60 221 60 60 221 
17 731 85 60 221 221 85 
18 60 60 85 85 60 60 
19 221 60 60 60 85 60 
20 60 60 60 60 60 60 
21 60 60 60 60 60 60 
22 60  60 60 60  
23 60    60  
24 60      
  
By taking a closer look at the composition of the packets, some assumptions can 
be made to cull the data a bit further into something more useful for this research. Table 




packets. They are acknowledgments to the server for specific frames outlined in red in 
Figure 8 and can be considered extraneous for this research. The variance in the 
number of these packets is not a product of the different types of transactions process 
(i.e., withdrawal, vs. balance check) but varying network infrastructure conditions 
between the ATM and the processing server that may require the re-transmittal of a 
packet or a duplicate acknowledgment. This is seen with more clarity when looking at 
the ATM start-up packet capture which can be seen in Table 6 and is discussed further 
in this paper. These are indicated by the light blue background in the cells of Table 2.  
 
Figure 8. Overhead Packet 
When the data is culled to remove the overhead packets, the new table once 




left are the important packets. Table 3 shows the six test transactions and the important 
packets that make up each transaction. 
Table 3 
Data Packets with Overhead Packets Removed 
 
 Table 4 shows the protocol used, length, and other information about each of the 
important packets. The packet number and time stamp were removed to allow enough 
space to display the relevant information. The raw data and truncated tables are 






Typical Transaction Packet Data and Information 
Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello 
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 443  >  49165 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
 
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 443  >  49165 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
 
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Server Hello, Certificate 
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 Server Key Exchange, Server Hello 
Done 
 
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher 
Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
 
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted 
Handshake Message 
 
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 731 Application Data 
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data 
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert 
 
Data Analysis 
 To answer each of the research questions, each data capture was filtered to only 
include the packets relevant to the transaction between the ATM and the processing 
server. For each of the six transactions, the overhead packets were removed leaving 




transaction were compared with regards to their number, size, and order processed. 
The results can be found in each of the Appendixes. For each of the six transaction 
types, the appendix includes the Wireshark capture as well as an exported CSV file 
displayed in Microsoft Excel. Each of the CSV files were then manipulated to remove 
the overhead packets. Then each of the transaction’s packets were compared and this 





Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 This research is intended to discover the packet characteristics of Ethernet traffic 
from a common retail ATM. The results of the research show both some expected 
results and interesting changes from previous work.  
Results 
 The answer to each of the study questions begins with looking at the general 
transaction packets. Each transaction, when overhead packets are removed from the 
analysis, was constructed of 18 packets. The initial SYN-ACK packets, which could be 
considered overhead, are included in the table below since they are required to set up 







Final Packet for Analysis 
 
Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 62 49165  >  443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 Len=0 
MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1  
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 443  >  49165 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=8190 Len=0 MSS=1436  
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 49165  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=33028 
Len=0  
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello  
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 443  >  49165 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=308 
Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a 
reassembled PDU]  
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 443  >  49165 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 Ack=308 
Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a 
reassembled PDU]  
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Server Hello, Certificate  
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done  
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, 
Encrypted Handshake Message  
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake 
Message  
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 731 Application Data  
206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data  
192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert  
 
For each of the six transaction types in Study Question 1, the packet construction 
was consistent without deviation of non-overhead packets. Because of the predictability 
of the packet lengths, no matter the transaction type, it creates the possibility of created 
a forensics benchmark for ATM Ethernet traffic. The combination of 18 packets with 




should produce a profile with a high probability of identifying this specific traffic. The 
results for each research question are as follows: 
1. How many packets make up each of the 6 transactions types? 
a. There are 13 packets of consistent length that made up each transaction. 
Refer to Appendixes A through F.  
2. Is each packet of predictable length? 
a. Yes, when the overhead packets were removed, the packets were 
consistent in length. Refer to Appendix H. 
3. Is packet length influenced by transaction type? 
a. No, there is not any variance in packet length noted from one transaction 
type to another. Refer to Appendix H 
4. What protocols were used throughout each transaction? 
a. The TCP protocol was used for each transaction with TLSv1.2 used for 
encryption and data integrity. Refer to Appendix A through H for the data 
captures that include the protocols use for each packet and each 
transaction. 
5. What known vulnerabilities exist regarding the packet construction and 
protocols used? 
a. Packet construction – predictable packet length may be vulnerable to a 
Teardrop attack, especially with the fragmented packets seen in the 
packet captures, most notably in the ATM start up capture as seen in 




low-rate DDoS attacks are configured often to use know packet lengths 
used by a service or service to mask the attack. It was also suggested that 
this could make the attack more difficult to discover in logs because the 
traffic has the many of the characteristics of expected packets. “Low-rate 
Distributed Denial-of-Service (low-rate DDoS) attacks are a new challenge 
to cyberspace, as the attackers send a large amount of attack packets 
similar to normal traffic, to throttle legitimate flows. (Zhou, Liao, Yuan, & 
Zhang, 2017, p. 1). 
b. TLSv1.2 – has at least six know vulnerabilities: (Prodromou, 2019). 
i. The Padding Oracle on Downgraded Legacy Encryption (POODLE) 
attack was published in October 2014 and takes advantage that 
some servers/clients still support SSL 3.0 for compatibility with 
legacy systems. There are several named vulnerabilities or offshoots 
of the POODLE name. Zombie POODLE and GOLDENPOODLE 
were presented at Black Hat Asia last month.  
Similar to ROBOT, DROWN and many other 
vulnerabilities affecting HTTPS, these issues stem from 
continued use of cryptographic modes which should 
have been long ago deprecated and yet are inexplicably 
still supported in TLSv1.2. In this case, the troublesome 
feature is that TLSv1.2 supports CBC mode 




ii. The Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS (BEAST) was disclosed in 
September 2011 and applies to SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 so it affects 
browsers that support TLS1.0 or earlier protocols. The same 
mitigation efforts for the POODLE vulnerability apply to BEAST. 
iii. The Compression Ration Info-leak Made Easy (CRIME) 
vulnerability affects TLS compression. The compression method is 
included in the Client Hello message (see Table 6) and it is 
optional. It is possible to establish a connection without 
compression. This appears to be a browser related vulnerability 
and may not apply to this research. However, it will be mentioned in 
future work. 
iv. The Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive 
Compression of Hypertext (BREACH) vulnerability is very similar to 
CRIME but BREACH targets HTTP compression, not TLS 
compression. This attack is possible even if TLS compression is 
turned off. As with CRIME, BREACH does not appear to be a 
vulnerability in this scenario. 
v. Heartbleed was a critical vulnerability that was found in the 
heartbeat extension of the popular OpenSSL library. This extension 
was used by the previous version of the retail ATM tested and is no 




For the ATM startup packet, there are some similarities in the number and size of 
packets. However, the data collected possibly shows some effects of the congested 
network segment to which the ATM was connected. As seen in Table 6, there are 
multiple packets that were re-transmitted, and segments not captured shown in cells 
with type in red. However, it seems that the process of the initial startup 
communications with the processing server is at least in part, duplicated with each 






ATM Start-up Capture 
No. Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
1 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.7 DHCP 342 DHCP Offer    - Transaction ID 0x61dd1155 
  
2 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.7 DHCP 342 DHCP Offer    - Transaction ID 0x61dd1155 
  
3 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.7 DHCP 342 DHCP ACK      - Transaction ID 0x61dd1155 
  
4 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.7 DHCP 342 DHCP Offer    - Transaction ID 0x61dd1156 
  
5 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.7 DHCP 342 DHCP ACK      - Transaction ID 0x61dd1156 
  
6 192.168.0.7 192.168.0.1 DNS 81 Standard query 0x0051 A EFTDEBITATM.FNFIS.COM 
7 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.7 DNS 97 Standard query response 0x0051 A 
EFTDEBITATM.FNFIS.COM A 206.71.17.21  
8 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 62 49164  >  443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 Len=0 
MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1  
9 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 443  >  49164 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8190 
Len=0 MSS=1436  
10 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 49164  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=33028 Len=0 
11 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello  
12 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 1514 [TCP Previous segment not captured] , Ignored 
Unknown Record  
13 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Ignored Unknown Record  
14 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 10#1] 49164  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=1 Win=33028 Len=0  
15 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done  
16 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 10#2] 49164  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=1 Win=33028 Len=0 
17 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 [TCP Retransmission] 443  >  49164 [PSH, ACK] 





Table 6 Continued 
No. Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
18 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 49164  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 Ack=3601 Win=32348 
Len=0 
  
19 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted 
Handshake Message  
20 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 443  >  49164 [ACK] Seq=3601 Ack=434 Win=35255 
Len=0  
21 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
22 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data  
23 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 443  >  49164 [ACK] Seq=3652 Ack=601 Win=40358 
Len=0 
24 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 150 Application Data  
25 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 49164  >  443 [ACK] Seq=601 Ack=3748 Win=32201 
Len=0 
26 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert  
27 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 49164  >  443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=632 Ack=3748 
Win=32201 Len=0 
28 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 443  >  49164 [ACK] Seq=3748 Ack=632 Win=40327 
Len=0 
29 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 443  >  49164 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3748 Ack=633 
Win=40327 Len=0 




 The conclusions of this research are surprisingly similar to those of previous work 
in that the transactions were predictable in packet numbers, size and sequence. In the 
view of the author, this presents two possibilities. The predictability can be used in 
forensics efforts to identify ATM traffic should packet inspection be needed to answer 
questions in an investigation of a compromised ATM. Secondly, it could present an 






 The results of this research have identified several areas of future work some of 
which would require gaining permission from the credit card issuing entities who own 
much of the proprietary infrastructure that retail ATMs connect too.  
 Beginning with the ATM startup capture, additional packet captures should be 
run to get a more accurate picture of what packets consistently make up the initial 
communication with the processing server. It should also be analyzed to determine what 
similarities if any exists between the startup communications packets and those that 
make up a customer-initiated transaction.  
 When choosing the transactions to test, two similar transactions were chosen 
intentionally with a minor change. For instance, two successful withdrawals but with 
different dollar amounts were processed. This was done with the idea of future work in 
mind if permission can be obtained for packet payload inspection and other efforts to 
identify meaningful data in each packet. In previous work it was noted that packets can 
contain human-readable data related to the processor. 
 It would also be useful to conduct cable tapping testing as Ethernet cables often 
exit the vault portion of the ATM and are easily accessible in a retail setting. Also, it is 
very common to find that the Ethernet cable servicing the ATM is cut, re-terminated to 
allow for a switch or hub to be placed near the machine to allow for the connection of 
other machines such as digital jukeboxes or other internet connected devices, now so 




 Lastly, the POODLE and compressions related vulnerabilities should be 
considered if permission for in-depth packet inspection were obtained. If compression is 
not used, there seems to be the potential for nefarious actors to, at a minimum, gain 
actionable intel or at the maximum, compromise a transaction or even be able to 
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Packet Sequence Comparison by Packet Number 
 
Table 7  
Packet Sequence Comparison by Packet Number 
 
No. Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
1 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 62 
49165  >  443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 
Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
1 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 62 
49166  >  443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 
Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
1 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 62 
49167  >  443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 
Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
1 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 62 
49168  >  443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 
Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
1 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 62 
49169  >  443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 
Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
1 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 62 
49170  >  443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 
Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
      
2 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49165 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=8190 Len=0 MSS=1436 
2 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49166 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=8190 Len=0 MSS=1436 
2 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49167 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=8190 Len=0 MSS=1436 
2 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49168 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=8190 Len=0 MSS=1436 
2 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49169 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=8190 Len=0 MSS=1436 
2 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49170 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=8190 Len=0 MSS=1436 
      
3 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49165  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 
Win=33028 Len=0 
3 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 





3 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49167  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 
Win=33028 Len=0 
3 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49168  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 
Win=33028 Len=0 
3 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49169  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 
Win=33028 Len=0 
3 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49170  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 
Win=33028 Len=0 
      
4 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello 
4 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello 
4 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello 
4 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello 
4 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello 
4 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 361 Client Hello 
      
5 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49165 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
5 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49166 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
5 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49167 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
5 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49168 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
5 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49169 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
5 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49170 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
      
6 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49165 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 




6 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49166 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
6 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49167 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
6 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49168 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
6 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49169 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
6 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 1514 
443  >  49170 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1461 
Ack=308 Win=35381 Len=1460 [TCP 
segment of a reassembled PDU] 
      
7 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Server Hello, Certificate 
7 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Server Hello, Certificate 
7 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Server Hello, Certificate 
7 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Server Hello, Certificate 
7 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Server Hello, Certificate 
7 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 392 Server Hello, Certificate 
      
8 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49165  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=2921 Win=33028 Len=0 
8 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 
Server Key Exchange, Server Hello 
Done 
8 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49167  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=2921 Win=33028 Len=0 
8 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49168  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=2921 Win=33028 Len=0 
8 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49169  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=2921 Win=33028 Len=0 
8 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49170  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=2921 Win=33028 Len=0 
      
9 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 





9 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49166  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=2921 Win=33028 Len=0 
9 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 
Server Key Exchange, Server Hello 
Done 
9 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 
Server Key Exchange, Server Hello 
Done 
9 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 
Server Key Exchange, Server Hello 
Done 
9 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 396 
Server Key Exchange, Server Hello 
Done 
      
10 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49165  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=3601 Win=32348 Len=0 
10 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 
Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher 
Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
10 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49167  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=3601 Win=32348 Len=0 
10 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49168  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=3601 Win=32348 Len=0 
10 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49169  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=3601 Win=32348 Len=0 
10 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49170  >  443 [ACK] Seq=308 
Ack=3601 Win=32348 Len=0 
      
11 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 
Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher 
Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
11 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49166 [ACK] Seq=3601 
Ack=434 Win=35255 Len=0 
11 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 
Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher 
Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
11 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 
Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher 
Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
11 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 
Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher 
Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
11 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 180 
Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher 
Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
      
12 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49165 [ACK] Seq=3601 




12 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 
Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted 
Handshake Message 
12 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49167 [ACK] Seq=3601 
Ack=434 Win=35255 Len=0 
12 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49168 [ACK] Seq=3601 
Ack=434 Win=35255 Len=0 
12 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49169 [ACK] Seq=3601 
Ack=434 Win=35255 Len=0 
12 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49170 [ACK] Seq=3601 
Ack=434 Win=35255 Len=0 
      
13 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 
Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted 
Handshake Message 
13 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 731 Application Data 
13 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 
Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted 
Handshake Message 
13 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 
Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted 
Handshake Message 
13 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 
Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted 
Handshake Message 
13 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 105 
Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted 
Handshake Message 
      
14 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 731 Application Data 
14 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49166 [ACK] Seq=3652 
Ack=1111 Win=39848 Len=0 
14 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 731 Application Data 
14 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49168  >  443 [ACK] Seq=434 
Ack=3652 Win=32297 Len=0 
14 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49169  >  443 [ACK] Seq=434 
Ack=3652 Win=32297 Len=0 
14 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 731 Application Data 
      
15 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49165 [ACK] Seq=3652 
Ack=1111 Win=39848 Len=0 
15 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data 
15 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49167 [ACK] Seq=3652 




15 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 731 Application Data 
15 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 731 Application Data 
15 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49170 [ACK] Seq=3652 
Ack=1111 Win=39848 Len=0 
      
16 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data 
16 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49166  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1111 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
16 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data 
16 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49168 [ACK] Seq=3652 
Ack=1111 Win=39848 Len=0 
16 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49169 [ACK] Seq=3652 
Ack=1111 Win=39848 Len=0 
16 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data 
      
17 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49165  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1111 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
17 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert 
17 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49167  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1111 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
17 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data 
17 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TLSv1.2 221 Application Data 
17 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert 
      
18 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert 
18 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49166  >  443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1142 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
18 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert 
18 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert 
18 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49169  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1111 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
18 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49170  >  443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1142 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
      
19 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49165 [ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1142 Win=39817 Len=0 
19 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49166 [ACK] Seq=3819 




19 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49167 [ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1142 Win=39817 Len=0 
19 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49168  >  443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1142 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
19 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TLSv1.2 85 Encrypted Alert 
19 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49170 [ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1142 Win=39817 Len=0 
      
20 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49165  >  443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1142 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
20 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49166 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1143 Win=39817 Len=0 
20 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49167  >  443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1142 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
20 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49168 [ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1142 Win=39817 Len=0 
20 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49169  >  443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1142 
Ack=3819 Win=32130 Len=0 
20 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49170 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1143 Win=39817 Len=0 
      
21 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49165 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1143 Win=39817 Len=0 
21 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49166  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1143 
Ack=3820 Win=32130 Len=0 
21 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49167 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1143 Win=39817 Len=0 
21 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49168 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1143 Win=39817 Len=0 
21 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49169 [ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1142 Win=39817 Len=0 
21 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49170  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1143 
Ack=3820 Win=32130 Len=0 
      
22 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49165  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1143 
Ack=3820 Win=32130 Len=0 
22 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49167  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1143 




22 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49168  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1143 
Ack=3820 Win=32130 Len=0 
22 206.71.17.21 192.168.0.7 TCP 60 
443  >  49169 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3819 
Ack=1143 Win=39817 Len=0 
      
23 192.168.0.7 206.71.17.21 TCP 60 
49169  >  443 [ACK] Seq=1143 
Ack=3820 Win=32130 Len=0 
      
 
